This chapter examĩS the ambitious Phenix project, a global project for the whole computerization of ail Courts and Tr bunals in Belgium, with the use of ICT by ail stakeholders. It focuses especially on the legislative masures that have been taken, mainly in relation to data protection and legal value of the docum nts generated by the use of the electronic procedure.
INTRODUCTION
forth. ln other words, Phenix is a global project for the whole computerization of ail courts and tribunals in Belgium. Since the introduction of the dossier until its notification, Phenix aimed to have the actors involved in these different phases: the lawyers, the magistrates, the regPhenix is the brand n~me of a project which aims to introduce ICT at Il the steps of the judicial procedure in Belgiu , no matter the affair engaged in: criminal,' civil, commercial, and so
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the different levels; and (3) the idea that such a centralized projectwill diminish atmidterm the costs of the functioning of the tribunals. Several technical working groups6 have been settled up in order to elaborate and formulate the needed recommendations to address to the legislator, to the fumisher chosen, and definitively to the different actors involved by this revolution. The first concrete works have started in 2002; two acts have been promulgated in order to fix the legal context of the Phenix project, and no legs than 18 royal decrees have to be drafted. Notwithstanding aIl the efforts of aIl the actors and the budget afforded to ensure the success of the project, recently in March 2007, the present Ministry of Justice has announced the Phenix project's failure and the obligation to stop the works initiated.ltseems thatthis failure is due to the difficulties met by the supplier to solve complex technical problems. A litigation is in course before a Belgian court between the state and its furnisher. The next government, which will beformed afterthe nextelections in June, will have to decide which foIlow-up will be given to the project. From this bad Belgian experience, a first conclusion must be drawn: even ifwe need to have a global project in order to structure aIl thedevelopments, it isabsolutely needed to start with local and dedicated experiences in order to learn apart from these partial experiences how to adapt continuously these developments and to solve the concrete difficulties met at any stages. Another benefit of this experimental approach is also to progressively convince aIl the stakeholders (the magistrates, the registrars, the process servers, the lawyers, and, finally, the citizens) of the benefits of the project and to hear from them their expectations about such a project. Too much reluctance has been met from different groups, shocked by this managerial revolution imposed without real consultation. istrars, the pu lic prosecutors, and the process servers use t e technologies in a secure and efficient way. This very ambitious project has been approve by two legislative acts. The first one, the "Phe ix Act," was enacted on August 10,2005.2 It i stitutes the information system called "Pheni ," describes its mission, and sets up different gans in order to regulate the system. What is ore noticeable in that legislation is the importa ce given by the legislatorto apply and follow str ctly the data protection principles in order to b ild up the Phenix Information System. The econd act "relative to the judicial procedure by electronic way" dates from July 10, 20063 an aims to modify certain provisions into the ivil and Penal Procedural Code in order to gi e legal value to the documents generated by e use of the electronic procedure settled up by the Phenix Information System. Our short co tribution will analyze these two facets ofthis egislative input.
Before sta ing, perhaps a few words about the origin4 a d the present situation of the Phenix Belgi n model would be needed. Apart from 1990, ertain initiatives were taken ln Belgium, but these initiatives were local and not sufficientl coordinated. They were focusing on the intern 1 use by tribunals of computers and the devel pment of certain software aiming to suppo the tribunal members' work. The concept of a lobaI "e-justice" project has been launched by t e previous government in 2000, on the basis f the studies realized by a large consortium,S oining together all the stakeholders,andacall ortenderhas been issued in 2001. Three main ncerns explain the launching of a global and strongly centralized project: (1) the develop ent of the Internet which creates an opportun y but also an absolute need to integrate the different databases; (2) the obligation to av .d aIl the problems raised by the incompatibil ty between the material used at 187 PHENIX: AN ILLU TRATION OF  THE PRINCIPLE 'DESIGN BY  PRIVACY"7 AND  BOUT THE  DIFFICULTY TO  ESPECT THE  CONSITUTIONAL  RINCIPLE  ABOUT THE SE~ RATION OF 
POWERS
Article 2 of the 2005 ct setting up Phenix is enunciated as follows: "Il est créé un système d'information appelé henix qui a pour finalités la communica ion interne et externe requise par le foncti nement de la Justice, la gestion et la conse ation des dossiers judiciaires, l'instauratio d'un rôle national, la constitution d'une ba ue de données de jurisprudence, l'élaboratio destatistiquesetl'aide à la gestion et l'admin stration des institutions judiciaires. "("It is se Led up an Information system called Phenix, w ich has for purposes the internai and external c mmunication requested for the Justice needs, he setting up of a case Law data base, the wor ing out of statistics and the assistance to the m nagement and administration of judicial instl utions 'jThis provision and the precise enum ration of the different purposes of the Pheni project is illustrative of the importance given b the legislator to follow strictly the first Privacy rinciple: aIl processing must be created for legi imate, deterrninate, and explicit purposes.8
The following prov.sions of the act are describing more precisely these different purposes and implicitly are tixi g the recipients of the different processing, t e data to be processed, and the duration of the data storage, according to the principle of prop rtionality: "Data might be processed and kept nly ifthey are necessary for the achievement 0 the legitimate purpose of the processing."9 0 examples might be given on that point. rticle 7 distinguishes the court decisions da bases used for internaI purposes and the court decisions databases diffused publicly. As regards the second category, the act imposes the dut Y to make anonymous the decisions before any diffusion. What is not asked as regards the first category insofar is that the purpose of this second processing ought to support the members of the jurisdiction having issued the decision to "maintain a consistency as regards its jurisprudence," as explained by the Ministry of Justice. Another example definitively is the use of certain data for statistical purposes(art.l0and fi), which might help internally to support decisions about the management of the tribunals, but might never be used for controlling the work achieved by each judge individually.
This concern to follow the privacy requirements explains also the importance given to the security of the different processing. This obligation to have secure processing must be the object of different royal decrees, and certain norms might be imposed at that point. This obligation raises certain problems. So, as regards the access to the different fi les opened at a court, it has been foreseen that the access will be open to ail the members of the Bar Association. The control of the identity and the quality of the requester will be ensured as regards the first point by the use of a secure authentication and, as regards the second, by the fact that the requester belongs to the lists held by the different Bar Associations under the basis of his or her national registration number. This checking method has raised difficulties. Certain lawyers have refused to give their national registration number to the Bar Association and have raised privacy concerns about the obligation to use their electronic identity card as a unique way ofauthentication, arguingthatthey would like to d istinguish clearly the authentication method they are using in the context of, from one part, their professional activities and, from the other part, as citizens.1o
Another more crucial problem was the control of the legitimate interest of the requester 188 The BelgianlCase to have ac ess to the different files.11 Finally, the system roposed was the possibility for the lawyer in c arge of the file to know through the login of ail e access to control a poj'teriori the names oft e colleagues which have access to the files. It s not obvious that fuis system will be sufficien to avoid any abuse.
Other q estions about the application of the data protec ion have to be mentioned. Particularly, it has been pointed out that the right of the data su 'ects must be respected by the data controller. ata subjects are ofvarious natures: definitively, .t concerns aIl the citizens which are concerned b the litigation directly (the plaintiff and the assi nee) but also indirectly (a person quoted by t e judge, a witness), it might be also the advocat s and the judges. So the question is: to what exte t the present provision" included in our civil or nal procedural codes enacting a limited righ of access are complying with the data protect on legislative requirements about the right to e informed, the right to get access, and the righ to correct or delete certain data? This questi n is stiJl discussed.12
The mai problem met by the legislator by setting the Phenix information system surely was he choice of the different organs to be install d in order to manage and to fuie the develop ent of this information system. Three maiq concerns have to be taken into consideratio .The first one was to respect the holy and co stitutional principle of the separation of pow rs, particularly the split between the executiv power and the judicial one. The second addr sses the delicate question of the data protecti n and again the question of separation of po ers between the legislative power represented y the Data Protection Authority (the Belgian ommission pour la protection de la vie privée and the judicial one. How do we ensure the c mpliance of the Phenix development with t e data protection requirements? Finally the t ird one is to ensure that the information system meets the needs of the different stakeholders involved.
To answer to these concerns, the Phenix Act puts into place three organs: the "Management Committee" (Comité de gestion), the "Surveillance Committee," and, finally, the "Users' Committee." The main competence of the first one is to ensure the daily management ofPhenix and to take aIl initiatives which will contribute to its efficiency. The committee has therefore the possibility to decide on different aspects like technical agreements, conformity certificates as regards the legal value of certain electronic documents, and to establish control and security mechanisms.13 It proposes to the Ministry the draft of the royal decrees needed for the implementation of the legislative texts. An annual report about the committee's activities must be established for the Highest Court of Justice (Cour de cassation) and the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, the committee has to intervene in case of technical deficiencies or non respect of the Phenixrules. Thecommittee's composition reflects the duality of nature of the Phenix system belonging both to the executive power and to the judicial one. Twelve members nom inated by the King are composing the committee, 6 under proposaI by the judicial power, and 6 under the proposaI of the Ministry of Justice.
The "Surveillance Committee" is establ ished by the Phenix Act as a sectoral Data Protection Authority established within the Belgian Data Protection Authority but having a lot of autonomy and no subject to control by its mother institution.14 Furthermore, the comm ittee examines the complaints introduced as regards the nonrespectofthe data protection provisions and might introduce any proposaIs about ail questions relative to privacy requirements applied to the Phenix information system and its evolution. The composition of this committee has been subjecttoa lot ofd iscussion betweenthejudicial power and the Data Protection Commission.15 189 The judicial power i a tirst moment rejected any form of interfer nce by the Data Protection Authority, acce ,ting only the presence of a member of the ata Protection Authority and only with consu tative voice. Finally, the compromise propose by the government and taken again by the ac was to have a committee withsixmembers,th echosenbytheDPAand the three others nom nated by the parliament amongst the magistr es. The chairman necessarily must be a mag strate.
The last organ to be put into place is the "User's Committee,' in charge of proposing to the Management ommittee any initiative in order to promote t e Phenix use. The committee joins together 4 members representing aIl the stakeholders ut with a huge majority ofmagistrates (16/24 .It illustrates once again the fear expressed d ing aIl the discussion by the magistrates abo t the risk of losing their independence in th same time information systems were introd ced in their office.. The second principle is the equivalency principle. Under this principle, the electronic address is equivalent to a physical address and has the same permanency as the traditional one. Furthermore, it must be considered that aIl the electronic documents generated in the context of the procedure are assimilated as regards its legal value to a paper document and that electronic signature in that context have the same legal value than the traditional handwritten signature. As Montero19 pinpointed, it must be clear that under the 2006 Act, only advanced or under the Belgian terminology qualified signatures complying with the EU Directive requirements are recognized in the context of the e-justice system and not aIl electronic signatures2O in order to ensure an easier legal security. Finally, one pinpoints the principle of the unit y of the electronic file insofar as the electronic nature of the file; it is no more necessary to distinguish copies and original, insofar this latter might be reproduced in a nonlimited way.
PHENIX: HOW
As regards the relationships with the third parties, essentially meaningthe lawyersand the process servers, the idea is to authorize either the downloading of the files or certain pieces of the procedure either their access, through the Judiciary order's portal, only after a double checking: first, the requester of the access needs to be iden ified through a secure authentication; second, t e system will seamlessly check near the appro riate databases held by the professional ass iations, his or her quality. It is quite obvioust atthe Phenix system will support ail types of ocuments (open office, XML, PDF, etc.). Fin ly, the act contains certain provisions abo t the consequences of a not guilty21 dysfuncti n of the information system (virus, breakdow of the information system, etc.) which are ssimilated22 to Acts of God "when that dysfu ctioning hinders the exercise of the citizen's ri hts." Let us DOW have a look at the different seps of the procedure.
The in roduction of a litigation before a court (la ise au rôle) would have to be, apart from now, ealized by an electronic message}3 On that po nt, it might be remembered that the role is hel through electronic means publicly accessible, but any access is registered in order to avoid a ses as regards the privacy protection requir ments}4 The registrar automatically attributes the affair a specific identifying number w ich will follow the case during its entire judio all.ife (including in appeal or before the highest. Court of Justice). This identifying number co tains neither the name of the parties, nor ot er personal data. The registrar is in charge of aking the inventories of the files. Certain no s as regards the preservation of the integrit of the pieces notwithstanding the change into the technology must be defined.
As regar s DOW the management of the file, the Phenix 1 forrpation system will receivethe additional e ements appropriate to each step of the judicial procedure: "Toute autre communication pa pli simple ou recommandé peut avoir lieu lablement par voie électronique ou par intro uction dans le système Phenix."25 The article of the 2006 Act determines the moment oft e delivery of the electronic document as foll ws: "la délivrance d'un document électronique est le moment où le destinataire peut prendre connaissance du contenu de celuici" ln order to avoid any litigation as regards this moment, it ts possible to make recourse to a third party. ln that case, the moment of the delivery is fixed by the statement given by this third party certifying the delivery of the message to the recipient.
The fixation of the audience must also be done through electronic messages. The judgment will be issued and signed electronically by the judge before it is sent to the database, the internaI one, and after having been duly made anonymous by the Registrar, the publicly accessible one.
Two peculiar operations must be analyzed additionally, the "signification" and the "notification." Both operations are aimingto makethe citizen or his/her lawyer aware of the existence of the pursuit or of the judgment. For ensuring the se two operations, the use of an electronic message is possible26 through the intervention of a trusted third party who will have to ensure that the document has been delivered without modification (certificate of integrity) to the electronic address of the addressee and that this delivery has taken place at a precise moment (time stamping). For achieving it, the 2006 Act foresees the intervention of a "communication service provider"27 who will certify the delivery and the moment ofthis delivery}8 To be complete, it must be noted that the legislation puts in place a hybrid system in case the final recipient has no electronic address. ln that case, the service communication provider will make a copy on a paper certified conform of the message and deliver it to the process server who will deliver the document following the traditional way.
CONCLUSION
As regards the modifications introduced by the legislator into the civil procedural code, we might subscribe to the main principles asserted through the multiple provisions: the consent permits to avoid any risk of discrimination between those who adopt the new electronic system and the others more reluctant to it. The "functional equivalency" principle has permitted to introduce concept like electron ic address, electronic file, electronic signature, electronic signification, and notification. By doing that and by proposing a real secure communication system with the intervention of trusted third parties, control of access, double checking, and so forth, the Belgian legislator proposes to the other European legislator a really attractive model.
Isthere a BelgianPh nixmodel?lnmyopinion, it would be too eas to simply answer by the negative, invoking epresentfailure of the Phenix launching. It is bvious that the promoters have been too ambi jOUg and, perhaps, a more progressive approac associated with the actors, especially magistra s, registrars, and lawyers, step by step, worki g on specific domain and using pilot experien es would have been better. Notwithstanding th. se facts, one wou Id like to underline the qualit es of the legal framework put into place to ens re e-justice, which might be in my opinion vie ed as a model for foreign countries. 80 we mig t consider that the Belgian legislator, even if th solutions are not always perfect, has designe a privacy compliant system and that, throug the organs settled up, the independence of the judiciary power vis-à-vis the executive power is safeguarded.
REFERENCES FUTURE TREN~S
Two points have to considered as crucial in the future. First, sin e through a global information systems at th bands of the magistrates their informational p wer is increasing by their possibility to cross a ertain number ofinformation about the partie it must be feared that the principle of the "equa ity of the weapons" would not be respected. ln t atrespect, data protection requirements are im ortant. At the same time, the fact that the info ation system is operated and sometimes devel ped by the administration put at risk in the Ion term a progressive loss of the independence fthejudges. The solution proposed by the Bel ian legislation is in that perspective notice w rthy even if they appear a bit intricate and to complex as regards the day to day managem nt. The Belgian Priv cy Commission argued in the same sens in its opinion delivered May 24tb, 2006 out "Identification and electronic signatu e within the Phenix I.S." On that opinion, ee the Web site of The Belgian Privacy C mmission: http://www. privacycommissi n.be By example, one might imagine that a lawyer defendin a citizen against his neighbour for vic nit y questions will access differentfiles ncluding criminal files ofthis neighbour i order to argue against him.
On that point, see Danieli (2006) . Appeals againstth committee's decisions are foreseen befor the Highest Court of Justice (Cour de ssation). Once again, the existence ofthi recourse put into evidence the intent of he Belgian legislatorto maintain the inde ndence of the judiciary power by giving t it the last word. On that point. see the explanation given by the Ministry 0 Justice: "Par ailleurs, autoriser la Comm 'ssion de protection de la vie privée à évo uer des avis du comité 
